Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart: Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism by Chytilek, Roman
73
Roman Chytilek
Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart: 
Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit, 
and Authoritarian Populism
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2019. 540 pp.  
ISBN 978-1108444422
The eminent American social scientist Ronald Inglehart and the important American 
political scientist Pippa Norris, who specialises in conjunctural issues and broadly conceived 
comparative studies, have joined forces in Cultural Backlash to explain the current rise 
of “authoritarian populists” in many parts of the world. What do Donald Trump, Marine 
Le Pen, Viktor Orbán, Rodrigo Duterte and Jair Bolsonaro have in common? (The last, 
who only scored his major victory this year, when the book manuscript was already in 
press, is given less attention.) At the core of their political message is populism, defined 
by the authors in conformity with the emerging theoretical consensus as a style of politics 
built on criticism of a rotten establishment and, contrasted with it, emphasis on the primacy, 
purity and sovereignty of the people, seeing both (the people and the elite) as homogeneous. 
Combined with authoritarianism – a political discourse that emphasises the necessity 
of defending oneself against various external threats, and hence stressing security, group 
cohesion and conformity, as well as the role of a strong leader as the representative 
of the interests of the masses – populism is particularly dangerous to the survival 
of democracy. While populism questions the fundamental institutions of democracy (for 
example, the principle of representation), authoritarianism fights democratic values, such as 
respect for the rights of minorities, working to achieve consensus, or at least a compromise, 
the separation of the private from the political, and respect for the rules of the political game.
Generically, the book falls somewhere between a large-scale comparative study 
(the data on voters’ values from the European Social Survey cover 32 countries) and an 
effort to provide a deep understanding of some unique milestones in authoritarian 
populism’s “backlash,” such as the victory of Donald Trump in the 2016 American elections 
and Brexit. But the book’s main added value is not so much its definition of an actor that 
uses a new ideological mixture or the cautious considerations of whether democracy as we 
know it will survive; it is, rather, a theory, supported by data, about where the authoritarian 
populists have come from. According to Inglehart and Norris, they are a response to 
the “silent revolution,” which since the 1970s has implied that the emphasis in the political 
arena is weakening on material values and shifting towards post-materialist issues such 
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as environmentalism and minority rights. This has been accompanied by the rise of green 
parties, or greater acknowledgment by the traditional parties of social liberalism. This shift 
in the median position of political representatives on this type of political issue provoked 
a conservative response, represented today so strongly by authoritarian populism. This 
argument is not new – it was first proposed in 1992 by the Italian political scientist Piero 
Ignazi, who, analysing the first wave of right-wing populism, represented by the French 
National Front and Austrian Freedom Party, introduced his “silent counter-revolution” 
thesis. Inglehart and Norris, however, develop the theory further. They show, for instance, 
that the conservative response does not necessarily imply a decline of liberal values, and its 
strength and conspicuousness is substantially linked with the fact that the electoral discipline 
of the left-wing post-materialists is appreciably weaker than that of the authoritarians. The 
strength of authoritarian populism over the past decade has also been fuelled by conjunctural 
factors, such as the economic and migration crises. At its core, however, the rise of this 
discourse is a natural and perhaps inevitable consequence of the shift of the political actors’ 
thematic focus, away from the socio-economic axis and towards socio-cultural issues. Without 
the success of socially progressivist political actors, authoritarian populism would never have 
become as strong as it is. The book also documents how voters’ values spill over into their 
electoral behaviour, and consequently also into the representation won by authoritarian-
populist parties. It likewise examines how the political discourse has changed in countries 
where the authoritarians have already risen to power, and assesses further developments 
largely through the lens of what the prognosis is for the dissemination of authoritarian values, 
and to what extent democratic political institutions are able to defend themselves.
An interesting finding for Central European readers is that the sources of authoritarian 
populism in their region are somewhat different from the rest of the countries examined. 
This can be demonstrated by the generational effect, for instance. The book shows that in 
most countries examined, social liberalism is generationally influenced, and is much stronger 
among millennials than with the older generation. There are only a few Eastern European 
countries where this does not apply, including the Czech Republic. That country also 
exhibits a less frequent pattern, in which populist values are supported more by the younger 
generation (in Western Europe they more frequently appeal to older voters).
Unfortunately, Inglehart and Norris’s work exhibits some of the appreciable risks 
of massive comparative studies, whose authors are usually not specialists in the politics 
of every country under study, and they seek to reduce error by relying on data obtained 
by a standardised – but contextually not very sensitive – operationalisation of some basic 
concepts. The measurement of political parties’ populist positions can furnish us with an 
example. This is done here on the basis of data from the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey 
(CHES). The survey regularly measures political parties’ positions on various issues, 
and investigates the salience of some of them; but it is fairly weak in terms of items 
operationalising populism. The authors have chosen two indicators: the importance of anti-
establishment rhetoric and the importance of the issue of political corruption. Whereas 
the first choice can be easily accepted, the second is very questionable: the populists link 
corruption exclusively with the rotten, old political elite, whereas the CHES question is much 
broader. This results in a devastation of face validity in certain countries. For instance, for 
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Slovakia during the period following the “Gorilla affair,” when corruption became a pivotal 
issue in party political competition – not as a rhetorical strategy of the populists, but as an 
everyday, lived experience – the American authors find that nearly all Slovak parties were 
“populist,” with the exception of Smer-SD, which was closely linked with the corruption, 
and hence did not talk much about it. Of the Slovak parties, the Christian Democratic 
Movement has the misfortune to score highly as a party of traditional values and order, 
and this includes the authoritarian dimension, which is operationalised not so much in 
terms of “authoritarianism” as by using variables that are commonly employed to measure 
social conservatism. Ultimately, this party, which of the traditional post-1989 Slovak parties 
has been historically the most supportive of social pluralism, is dragged through the mud 
and classified as authoritarian-populist. This issue, created by the unfortunate inclusion 
of the criterion of whether the topic of corruption was important for the party, is much 
broader and leads to more than half of the CHES parties being described as populist. Of these 
some provide the backbone to the party systems and government coalitions in the countries 
examined, and in no case can it be argued that their rhetoric is based on a dichotomy 
between the rotten elites and the sovereign people. While the book is fairly convincing in 
defining what authoritarian populism is – how it emerges, and why it presents a particularly 
dangerous combination for democracy – it fails drastically in its attempt to reliably identify 
the empirical representatives of authoritarian populism.
The book is also problematic when it descends to the level of individual countries, to 
provide examples to illustrate the authors’ argument. Most of the examples are concerned 
with the specific actions and expressions of authoritarian leaders. Given their peculiarly 
conceived role of a tribune (they speak on behalf of a homogeneous people, but expect 
the people to accept their role without reservation and to not interfere with it in any way), 
this makes sense, content-wise. What I am after is not so much starting a discussion about 
whether this is a desirable strategy in a largely quantitative, massive comparative study, as 
the facticity of some of the details. For example, one reads in the book that the 2015 Polish 
election was won by “Lech and Jarosław Kaczyński’s” Law and Justice party (the first brother 
had perished in 2010), and that Miloš Zeman’s slogan in the 2018 presidential election was 
“You’re no longer alone” and not “This is our country.” This raises concerns.
The final impression from this voluminous book is therefore somewhat unconvincing. 
On the one hand, it offers an evidence-based story about the rise of a political actor whose 
nature is very dangerous (here the book stands on firm ground). On the other, it suffers 
because the available data are not always able to fulfil the authors’ considerable ambition. 
The compromises they have to make to pursue their project, as far as valid operationalisation 
and factual precision are concerned, are not at all small.
